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INTEG RATE D FINAN CIAL SU PE RVISIO N FO R, I{ IG E R.IA:
EMERGING ISSUES AND CHATTENGES
BY
Nnachi Arua
Lecnrer, Depanment of Banking and Finance,
Ebonyi State Unioersity, Abahnlihi

ABSTRACT
The paper considers the issues of separation of financial supervision from centrol
banking and the rationale and challenges of establishing on integrated supervision
stntcture in Nigeria. lt argues lhqt sbtce the Nigerianf ancial system is just recovering
from shocks transmitted to the economy from the global Jinancial crisis, this time may
not be quspicious to introduce an integrated supervisory regime thal is separatefrom the
centralbank.It recommends that the Govenrment should consider carefully the casesfor
and against central bank's financial supervision based on the circumstances and
capqcities in Nigeia. The gover ment should also consider the rationale and

challenges ofintegratedfinancial supemision before taking a decision to consolidate
the supervisory ageflcies in Nigeiq into a single agency.

Nnachi Arua
INTRODUCTION
ln recent decades, issues on changes

in the supervisory architecture of
financial institutions have been of
interest to policymakers and the
academic. lt began to be discussed in

the late eighties when the
Scandinavian countries were
establishing a single supervisory
authority in their country. The

discussion heated up in the late
nineties when the United Kingdom
created the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) and continued in this
decade as many developed and
developing countries consider the
adoption of more integ rated
su

pervision structures.

ln most cases countries experiencing

banking crisis or systemic problems
have had cause to reconsider their
banking supervisory architecture. ln

the United Kingdom, the

JohnsonMattheyfailure, the Bankof Credit and
Commerce lnternational case of 1991
and the Barings case of 1995 were
interpreted by the public as being
responsibility ofthe central bank. This
led to the creation of the FSA in 1997
as separate agency to handle

a

Korea and the consolidation of four
financial supervisory authorities into a

sing le Financial Supervisory
Committee responsible for banking
and financial services supervision.
Estonia experienced severe banking
crisis in 1998 and 1999 and the
Estonian parliament adopted the
Financial Supervisory Authority in
2001 as the body replacing the central

bank for financial supeNision. Latvia

experienced banking and financial
crises in 1995 and in 1998, and in
2001 the Financial and Capital Market
Commission was created
a

as

consolidated institution for financial
supervision. ln Norway due to the
banking crisis in the early 1990s, the
possibility of merging the Banking,
Finance and Credit Commission with

ln Nigeria, the Presidential Steering
Committee on the Global Financial

Crisis with mandate

to

restore

confidence in the banking industry and

the financial services sector
recommends the establishment of an

independent oversight body
responsible

for financial

sector

surveillance and supervision. The new

body will comprise the relevant
departments/units that will be
responsible for overseeing the
banking industry, insurance industry,

pension funds, clearing house and

concentration of power ruled that the
BISC should continue as a separate
and independent agency.

aimed at taking away the responsibility
of financial service supervision from
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to
enable
concentrate on its core
policy
functions
mon eta
implementation and infl ation targeting.
The aim of this paper is to consider the

of Finance. But the parliament, in
order to avoid excessive

The G-30 has noted that the design of

national supervisory architecture
rarely takes place with policy makers

proceeding from

a

blank slate.
lnstead regulatory structures evolve

supervision. ln Sweden the creation of
Supervisory
Authority in 1991 was prompted by the

that may prompt reappraisal of
existing frameworks. The current

1990-199'l . The financial crisis in
1997 led to the overhaul of the
organization of the central bank of

integration.

capital market operations. The
establishment of the new body is

as a result of particular national

banking crisis that hit the country in

need to update and modernize their
financial supervisory structure to
accommodate financial evolution,
market rea lities, and global

the central bank was considered by a
committee appointed by the Ministry

banking and financial services

the Swedish Financial

all

debates, events and economic crises

global financial crisis has provoked

fresh debates in many countries such
as the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, lsrael etc. on the
26

it

of

ry

imolications and challenges of
creating an integrated supervisory
structure separate from the Cenkal
Bank in Nigeria.

The remaining part of the paper is
organized as follows: section 2
explains some concepts and reviews
related literature; section 3 discusses
the rationale of integrated financial

supervision

for Nigeria; section

4

deals with the challenges of integrated
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is

may a lso include disclosure

transacted

separate from the central bank and
section 5 concludesthe paper.

requirements, completion issues, and
anti money laundering regulations.
Since the enforcement of conduct of
business standards relies heavily on
the interpretation of rules, standards
and codes of conducts, lawyers tend
to dominate this function.

regard to its legal status. Each type of
business may have its own functional
regulator.

supervision

2.

for
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Nigeria that

Conceptual lssues and
Literature Review

The term flnancial regulation refers to

rules that govem the behaviour of
nancial intermediaries, and financial
supervision refers to monitoring and

by the entity,

without

Assessment: This approach remains
quite common and appears to work
well, so long as co-ordination among
agencies is achieved and maintained.

fi

Essentially, there are three

enforcement of the rules. The
functions of financial supervision fall

approaches to supervision. These are

general awareness that this may be

ln sectoral supervision

somewhat sub-optimal structu re.
Because of this a number of

into three broad categories: micro
prudential, macro prudential and
conduct-of- business supervision.
Micro prudential supervision checks

the individual financial

firm's

compliance with financial regulation.
It involves the collection and analysis
of information about the risks that the

firms take, their systems, and their
personnel. lt focuses on the solvency
on individual institutions rather than
the financial system as a whole.
Because micro prudential supervision
uses firm specific- information to

a

picture of risk and its
management it is often referred to as

generate

bottom- up supervision.

su

pervision is

concerned with the aggregate effect of
individual firms' actions. lt focuses on
systematically important institutions
and the consequences their behavior
may have for the financial market, its
objective is to limit flnancial system

distress that might damage the real
economy. Because aims to

it

generate an overall picture of the
functioning of the financial sector,
macro prudential supervision is often
referred to as top-down supervision
since the evaluation of macro
prudential risk is based on
understanding of macro economic
and financial relationship economist
tend to dominate in this function.

Conduct of Business Supervision
Conduct

of business supervision

supervision.

each sector (banking, insurance, and
security market) is responsible for all

three objectives of supervision. ln
unified or integrated supervision, a
single supervisor takes charge of the

three objectives.

ln

pa

rtial

supervision one or more supervisory
agencies could be responsible for

prudentlal supervision and another
agency could be responsible for
conduct of business supervision or
one supervisor could be responsible

for two sectors and

supervisor responsible

another

for

the

remaining one.

The G-30 Report on the structure of
financial supervision released on 6"

Macro Prudential Supervision

Macro prudential

sectoral, unified and partial

is

concerned with consumer protection.

But rather than focusing on the
protection of clients from the

of individual financial
institutions, it emphasizes
safeguarding client from u nfa ir
practices. Conduct of business
insolvency

surveillance involves monitoring

potential conflicts of interest between
a financial institution and its clients. lt

October 2008 identified 4 approaches
supervision cunently employed

to

across the

globe. The G- 30 is an

international body comprising central
bank governors, leading economist
and private financial sectors experls.

The study also assessed

the

strengths and weaknesses of each
approach. The approaches include:

INSTITUTIONALAPPROACH
lnstitutional approach is one in which
the firm's legal status (bank, broker -

dealer, insurance company),

determines which regulator is tasked
with overseeing its activity from both a
safety and soundness and a business
conduct perspective.

Assessment: 'The study considered
the institutional approach to be the
most strained models. The structure
is sub-optimal given the evolution of
the flnancial markets and institutions.
The countries reviewed the use ofthis
approach in China, Hong Kong and
Mexico.

However,

the study observed

a

jurisdictions are moving away from the
functional approach toward twin peaks
or integrated approaches. Countries
reviewed that adopt this approach
include Brazil, France, ltaly, and
Spain.
INTEGRATED APPROACH

lntegrated approach is one in which a
single universal supervision conducts
both safety and soundness and
conduct of buslness supervision for all

the sectors of financial

services

business.

Assessment: This approach

is

considered to be effective and efficient
in smaller markets where oversight of
a broad spectrum of financial services
can be successfully conducted by one

supervisor. lt has been adopted in
large complex markets where it is
reviewed as a flexible and streamlined

approach to supervision. However,

some observers believed that this
approach may create the risk of a
single point of regulatory failure. The
challenges of coordination among
supervision in times of disturbances
appear to be evident. The

jurisdictions reviewed include
Canada, Germany, Japan, Qatar,
Singapore, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom.

TWIN PEAKSAPPROACH
Twin peaks is a form of supervision by
objective. lt is one in which there is a

separation of supervisory functions
between supervisors. One that
performs the safety and soundness
supervision function and the other that

focuses on conduct

of

business

supervision.

Assessment: The twin

is one which

pea ks
approach is designed to gamer many
of the benefits and efficiencies of the

supervising oversight is determined
by the business that is being

integrated approach while at the same
time addressing the inherent conflicts

FUNCTIONALAPPROACH

Functional approach

27
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that may arise from time to

time
between the objectives of safety and

soundness regulation and consumer
protection. The ju risd ictio n s
reviewed are the Netherlands and
Australia. A number of jurisdictions

Another rationale for central bank
supervision of banks is that central
bank may have comparative
advantage in recruiting and retaining

the best staff due to its ability

to
provide supervisor compensation and

to

are engaged in debates over adopting

professional development

this type of approach. These include

(Abrams and Taylor, 200'l ). However,
Haubrich (1996) noted that to the
extent central banks need timely and

France, ltaly, Spain, lsrael, the United
Kingdom and the United States. The

Report of the G-30 can serve as a
framework for a country that wishes to
reform its supervisory system.

Aserous contentious issue is whether
the central bank should be involved in

financial supervision. Proponents
argue that because banks are the
mnduit through which changes in
short term interest rates are
transmitted, the central banks needs

to

have accurate and timely

information about the conditions and
performance of banks as
pre-

a

condition for effective conduct of
monetary policy. ln addition, without

hand on bank supervision

responsibility the central bank may
take too little account of conditions in

the banking sector when

setting

monetary policy. Again, the central

bank needs

to

have access

to

information on the solvency and
llquidity of the banks in order to
exercise its functions of lender of last
resort l(Goodhart and Shoemaker

(1993), Goodhart (1995),

Peek,

Rosengren and Tootell (1999)1.

The Federal Reserve Board in the
United States insist that without direct

involvement in micro prudential
oversight of banks, its monetary
policy would suffer and it would be

less able to manage the full range of
crises from bank failures to terrorists

incidents. The chairman of the
Federal Reserves Board, Ben

Bemanke (2007) has reiterated the
case by arguing that "the information,

staff

accurate information; this can be
accomplished through information
sharing arrangement with ban k
supervisory authorities. With the
responsibility for supervision
removed from the central bank and
placed in another agency, it is
possible that a debate over the proper
course of both supervision and macro
economic polices may benefit from a
competition of ideas.

ln the case where the central bank
has dual responsibility for financial
supervision and monetary policy, it
may pursue a too loose monetary
policy in orderto avoid adverse effects
on banks' earnings and credit quality.

Giving

a

central bank supervisory

power could make it reluctant to raise

interest rates and stem inflation
whenever such actions would hurt the
banks. The central bank mightview its
primary function as protecting banks,
not the public interest. The banking
industry which is better organized and
more directly affected by monetary
policy than the public could "capture"
the central bank and gain undue

influence [(Haubrich

(1 996 ),
Goodhart and Shoemaker (1995),
Abrams and Taylor (2001)1. lt is
therefore argued that supervision
detracts a central from its primary
function of conducting monetary
policy.

of

power

in

an
independent central bank may also

expertise and powers that the Fed
derives from its supervisory authority
enhance its ability to contribute to
efforts to prevent crises, and when
financial stresses emerge and public
action is wananted, the Fed is able to
respond more quickly, more
effectively and in more informed way

lead to establishment of a single
supervision outside the central bank.
Briault (1999) argued that the wider is
the role of the central bank, the more

than would otherwise be possible". Di
Noia and Di Giorgio ('1999), using

that there is no "one right answer" and
that the answer will largely depend on

OECD countries data, found that
banks seem to be more profitable
when central banks supervise them.

Another key issue that relates to
central bank supervisory function is
whether it should supervise other

financial services sectors as well,
such as securities and insurance

sectors. Overall, the arguments in the

literature reviewed by Barth et al
(2002) weigh more heavily against it
because (i) it will lead to excessive

concentration of power, (ii) the conflict
of interest will be more intensive, and.
(iii) it could unduly extend the flnancial
safety net if the central bank's lender
of last resort function is seen as

extending across

all

financial

institutions.

Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006)
showed that 69 out of 151 countries
sampled have only the central bank
as a banking supervisor,2l countries

assign

ba

n

king supervision

responsibilities to the central bank
and other supervisory authority and
61 countries do not assign banking
supervision to the central bank.

3.1

lntegrated Supervision for
Nigeria

ln Nigeria, the Central Bank of Nigeria

(CBN) supervises banks and nonbanking institutions such as discount
houses, finance companies, primary
mortgage institutions and bureauxde-charge. The National lnsuranc€
Commission (NAICOM) supervises
the insurance industry. The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC)
supervises the securities markets,

and the National Pension
Commission (PENCOM) supervises
pension funds business. The Nigeria

Deposit lnsurance Commission
complements the efforts of the CBN in

Concerns about excessive
concentration

preference of the public.

subject it become to political
pressures, thus threatening its
independence. The genelal

consensus in the literature so far is

country specifE circumstances and
capacities. These include prevailing
conditions in the linancial system, the
political e nviron me nt and the
28

supervising insured commercial
banks. Nigeria adopts the sectoral or
institutional approach to supervision.
But the guidelines for the practice of
universal banking in Nigeria released

in

December 2000 allowed

a

universal bank to be regulated based
on the type of activities it engages in.
Abank is free to choose which actrvity
or activities to undertake (clearing

house activities, capital market

or insurance marketing
services or a combination thereof). A
activities,

bank embarking on underwriting/
issuing house activity is expected to
com

ply with registration and

regulation requirements of the SEC.

Volume 32, No. 3
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Similarly, a bank embarking on
insurance marketing services is

entire financial sector.

expected to complywith the regulation

supervisory playing filed. Consistency
in rule making and oversight will
eliminate opportunities for regulatory
arbitrage across sector and eliminate
possibility that firms in one sector can

of

NAICOM. This makes the

supervision of universal banks to be
by functional approach.

The Presidential Steering Committee

on Global Financial Crisis

Second,
integrated supervision will level the

gain market share at the expense of
firms in another sector.

recommends the establishment of an

integrated supervision structure for
Nigerian financial institutions. This
entails the consolidation of banking,
insurance, securities and pension
funds supervisory authorities into a
single entity. There is a Financial
Services Regulation Coordinating
Comm ittee (FSRCC) that is

Third, proponents

Cause the reduction of
arbitrage opportunities usually
created by differing regulatory

and supervisory standards
among supervisory authorities.

Deliberate on p roble ms
experienced by any member in

its

fi

relationship with any

nancial institutions.

Eliminate any information gap
encountered by an regulatory
agency in relationship with any

group

of financial institution,

and
Articulate the strategies for the
promotion of safe, sound and
efflcient practices by financial
institutions.

But the FSRCC pursues the
strict regulatory functions of the
central bank as a whole (CBN

Act,2007).

of

integrated

supervision underline the economiesof-scale that can be achieved through

centralized regulatory functions that

of
administrative, information
permit the development

joint

rationalized on the following grounds:
first, the introduction of universal
banking where a bank can provide
financial services across different
segments of the financial industry
(banking, securities and insurance)

makes integrated supervision in
Nigeria necessary. Having all the
supervision responsibilities under
"one roof', the single agency can
arguably better understand the risk
arising not only in a single financial
sector, but also among multi-sector
financial intermediaries within the

Ch

ile,

Croatia,

Africa.

3.2

Lesson from the United
Kingdom

Beginning 1997, the UK consolidated
I different regulatory entities into the

The FSA is the sole supervisory
authority for micro prudential and
conduct of business issues, but it
shares macro prudential oversight
with the Bank of England and Her
Majesty Treasury. The UK has a more

lized approach to crisis

technology, and other support

fo rma

functions (Taylor and Fleming, 1999).

structure. But

lntegrated financial supervision was
flrst introduced in Singapore in 1984.
NoMay followed in 1986, Denmark in

excessive risk that large banks were

1988; and Sweden in 1991 . The most

influential reorganization took place in

the United Kingdom in 1997. This
entails supervision of ba n ks,
investment banks, asset managers,

insurance companies and pension
funds by one entity. As of 2006, there
were 24 fully integrated single
supervisory agencies in the world.
These include: Austria, Bahrain,
Bermuda, Cayman lslands, Czech
Repu b lic, Denmark, Estonia,
Germany, Gibraltar, Hungary lceland,

lreland, Japan, Latvia, Maldives,
Malta, Nicaragua, N o rway,
Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea,
Sweden, UAE and United Kingdom.
Cou

ntries that have partially

integrated

su

pervision agencies

include: Banking and lnsurance: 13
countries have combined banking
and insurance supervision under one

entity. These include: Auslralia,
Belgium, Canada, Colombia,

El Salvador, Guatemala,
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Malaysia, Peru,
Serbia and Venezuela.
Ecuador,

lntegrated financial supervision for
N igerian institutions can be

lgaria,

Financial Services Authority (FSA).

responsible for the following:
Coordinating the supervision of
fi nancial institutions.

Bu

Jamaica, Mauritius and South

Banking and Securities:

5

countries have combined

banking and securities firms'
supervision under one agency.

These include: Finland,
Luxembourg, Mexico,
Switzerland and Uruguay.

Securities and lnsurance: 8
countries have combined
secu rities and insurance
supervision under one body.
These include: Albania, Bolivia,

29

management based on the tripartite

exposed

it

failed

to

to in the current

spot

global

financial crisis. This forced the British

government to spend billions of
pounds to shore up several banks.
The country is currently considering
the Netherlands supervisory model of

Twin Peaks. The division of
responsibilities between the tripartite
authorities is set out in a Memorandum
of Understanding as follows:

The Bank of England is

responsible for the stability of
the monetary system through
its monetary policy function, for

the oversight of

financial
system infrastructure that is
systematically important to the

UK, in particular payment

systems, and for maintaining a
broad overview of the system
as a whole.

The FSA's role is set out in the
Financial Services and Markets

Act (FSMA) 2003. lt performs
micro prudential and conduct of
business supervision of all
regulated institutions in the UK.
The HM Treasury is responsible

for the overall

institutional

structure of financial regulation

and the legislation

which
no
responsibility for the activities of
the FSA and the Bank of
England, but if a financial
problem arises with potentially
system wide consequences,
the FSA and the Bank together
decide whether the Treasury
needs to be alerted. The MOU
states that the authorities
maintain f ra mewo rk for

governs it. lt has

July - Sept. 2008
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coordination in the
managemenl of a financial
crisis.

The current financial crisis revealed
the following inadequacies of the

British integrated f inancial

ln the Netherlands, the
central bank (De Nederland Bank) is

Australia.

responsible for macro and micro
prudential supervision of financial
instilutions and the Authority for
Financial Markets has responsibility
for supervision of conduct of

financial institutions not currently
subject to its supervision.

It is a paradox that while other
countries are considering how to
strengthen their central banks
capacity for enhancing financial

supervision structure:

business. Australia adopted

a

stability through increased

.

different kind of twin peaks in which

supervisory role in light of the current
flnancial crisis. Nigeria is considering
to separate financial supervision from

The sharing of macro prudential
oversight among the 3 parties

was nol without

ambiguity.
Although the Bank of England

has responsibility for

macro
prudential supervision, it lacked
the instrument, which is micro

prudential supervision, for its

enforcement.

The BOE lacked access

to

institutional- specific
information and close
understanding of the daily
operations of the financial
to function
effectively during normal
markets in order

business times and during a
overemphasized

conduct of business

supervision at the expense of

prudential supervision.
Co

ndu

ct-of-b

us in es

s

is

important and politically

sensitive, and its results are
easy to measure. While
prudential supervision is
conducted privately, its success
is less easily measured and has

lower political impact than

conduct of business
supervision.
A report commissioned by the British

Conservative

Pa

the
Australia Prudential Regulation
Authority (APRA), is located outside
the central bank and another
independent authority the Australia

rty

therefore

recommended, among other things,
thbt the government should consider

the case for and against the twin
peaks system in the UK. lt would
involve giving the Bank of England
responsibility for micro prudential as
well as macro prudential supervision

ofthe financial sector in addition to its
monetary policy role. leaving
responsibility for conduct of business
supervision with the FSA. A Twin
peaks approach would ensure lhat
the central bank had the information
needed to manage financial crisis. lt
would also reduce the potential for
conflict between conduct of business
and prudential supervision. The twin
peaks approach to supervision is
adopted in the Netherlands and

central banking as

Commission (ASIC) perform

s

conduct of business regulation.

4.

of lntegrated
Supervision in Nigeria
Challenges

lf a

decision is taken to remove
banking supervision from the central
bank because of the potential conflict
of interest between its monetary
policy function aimed at price stability
and bank supervision function aimed
ca refu I
consideration needs to be given to the

of information between
banking supervision and monetary
policy implementation. The important
lesion from the UK's experience is that
it is essentialforthe central bank to be
very closely involved in the micro
prudential supervision of flnancial
institutions, especially banks. Until
the crisis, there was a clear trend to
separate supervision from central
banking, but many now believe that
central banking and banking
supervision are closely connected.
With the central bank's responsibility
for financial stability, there is need for
an enabling instrument in the form of
micro prudential supervision that will
give it quick access to institutionspecific information during normal
synergy

a

measure of

restoring confidence in the financjal
system. However, De Luna Martinez

Securities and lnvestment and

at financial stability,

financial crisis.

The FSA

the prudential supervisor,

d

Rose (2002) noted that the
n to integrate financial

ecisio

supervision should be done only when

the linancial system is stable. The
Nigenan financial system is .lust
recovering from shocks transmitted to

the economy by the global financial
crisis. The crisis accelerated the crash
ofthe stock marked arid increased the

groMh of toxic assets arising from
banks exposure to margin lending and

extension of credit to the petroleum

sector. Until these toxic assets are
absorbed by asset management
companies as proposed, the financial
system is not yet stable for integrated
supervisory reform.

One critical issue that needs to be
resolved is who pays for the cost of
financial supervision if a new agency
is created; of course, the regulated
financial institutions. Masciandaro et
al (2006) analyzed the financial
governance of banking in a sample of
90 countries worldwide. They
conclude that supervisors in central
banks are more likely to be publicly
funded, while flnancial supervisory
authorities outside the central bank
are more likely to be funded through a
levy on the regulated banks. lf banks

are subjected to pay for the cost of

business times and financial crisis.

supervision now, that may compound
their problems.

The

The Central Bank of Nigeria has made

ce ntra I bank needs
comprehensive and detailed
information in real time to make quick

decisions.

Th

is is of

special

importance due to the risks to which
financial institutions are exposed,

against the

backg rou n d of
development of new, sophisticated,
and sometimes unfamiliar financial
products. The United States
Department of Treasury proposed
that the Federal Reserve should be
granted greater responsibility for
financial stability, including the
authority to supervise important
30

to strengthen its
banking supervisory functions. A real

sufficient effort

risk in creating an

integrated

supervisory agency separate from the

central bank is that it may lead to a
reduction in supervisory capacity as
professional staff opt to leave rather
than to lose the payand status usually
associated with being a central bank
employee. The reputation of banking

supervision may also suffer

jf it

is

associated with weaker securities and
insurance supervisory agencies.

Volurhe 32,No. 3
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At early stages of the transition from
multiple agencies to a single one, the

past experiences of countries that
adopt the framework shows that they

respond to market development.
Reddy (2001) observed that the
unification could lead to lack of clarity

in

functioning due

to

different

consistently had inltially lower

ob.iectives associated with different

supervisory effectiveness. They are
weighed down by practical problems

supervisory roles. Another inherent
danger of integrated supervision is
the monopoly position of a single
authority in the supervision of
financial industry. The resulting
multiplicity of tasks may cause
overload problems in monitoring if
such a move is associated with
resource cuts. This problems can
manifest itself as an internal problem
whereby the capability of upper
hierarchical levels of the supervisory
agency to oversee the lower ones
gets more limited or as an external
problem entailing limitations in the
ability of the supervisory authority to
monitorthe industry. The G-30 reporlt
that lhe integrated supervisory
approach may impose challenge of
coordination among supervisors in
times of disturbance and concludes
that it may create the risk of a single

such as legal constraints, departure of

experienced personnel, delays to
integ rate lT systems and
infrastructure of merged agencies.
demoralization of staff of the merged
entities, lack of mission and clarity in

the newly merged institutions, and
budgetary problems. lt takes an
average of one to three years to
compete the integration of supervision
agencies.

The success of a single supervisory
agency is highly dependent upon the
strength of the pre-existing multiple

supervisory agencies. Abram and
Taylor (2001) argued that to be
effective, the newly established
supervisory institution needs to
emulate/ reflect the structure of the
sectors that it supervises. Hence,
unless independent and effective

point of regulatory failure. Di Noia and

supervision from central banking point
interests
between central bank monetary policy

to the potential conflict of

function and financial supervision
function. Proponents of central bank
involvement in financial supervision
point to the information synergy that
exists between central bank monetary

policy function and financial

supervision function. What should
obtain depends largely on country's
specific circumstances and
capacities. The paper therefore
argued that since the Nigerian
financial system is just recovering
from shocks transmitted to the
economy from the global financial
crisis, this time may not be auspicious
to introduce an integrated supervisory
regime that is separate from the

centralbank.

lntegrated supervisory structure in
Nigeria can be rationalized on the
grounds to strengthen capacity to deal
with universal banking where financial

convergence

is

rising,

to

facilitate

harmonization of regulatory standards

the

and practices, and to achieve
economies of scale in monitoring

responsibilrties and objectives in one
agency may result in weak bank

different financial institutions. The
challenges include problems of legal

necessarily improve the supervision

monetary policy.

constraints, departure of experienced
personal, delays in integration, lack of

industry. Similarly, De Luna Martinez

5.

supervisory agencies have been well
established for each segment of the
financial system, the merging ofthese

institutions into one will not
and regulation of the financial

Di Glorgio (1999) claim that

combination of different

supervision and negatively affect

clarity
Concluding Remarks

and Rose (2003) argued that it is
imperative to address the
weaknesses of su pervision and
regulation al various levels of the

The paper has considered two basic
issues in linancial supervision. These

of agencies
that should supervise the financial

the rationale and challenges of
esta b lis h in g an integrated
supervision structure in Nigeria. lt

financial system before even
discussing the number

system. ln other words, if a blemish is
spotted on the supervisory functions

of the CBN, SEC,

NAICOM or
PENCOM prior to the consolidation,
such a blemish should be addressed
before the consolidated body can
function effectively.
The establishment of a single agency

supervisory can result

in

a

bureaucratic entity unable to rapidly

are the separation of

financial

supervision from central banking and

identified three basic functions ol
financial supervision as micro
prudential, macro prudential and
conduct-of-business supervision,
which address systemic stability,
financial soundness of individual
institutions and consumer protection
respectively.

Supporters of separation of flnancial
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in

functioning, difficult in

coordination among supervisors in
times of disturbance excessive
workload and a single point of
regulatory failure.

It is therefore recommended that the
government should carefully consider
the cases for and against central bank

supervision of banks based on
circumstances and capacities in

Nigeria before taking a decision to hive
the
central bank. Government should also
consider the rationale and challenges
of integrated financial supervision
before taking a decision to consolidate
all the supervisory agencies in Nigeria
into a single agency.

off financial supervision from
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